Leaked Cable Reveals Kenya Visa Case

A secret cable published last week by WikiLeaks shows for the first time how decisions to exclude foreign kleptocrats from the United States are made under Presidential Proclamation 7750.

The unredacted cable is from the U.S. Embassy in Kenya to the Secretary of State. It's dated September 16, 2009. Ambassador Michael Ranneberger classified the cable 'secret' and 'sensitive.'

Proclamation 7750 gives the State Department the power to ban from the U.S. foreign leaders and their family and friends involved with corruption or benefiting from it. Deliberations under Proclamation 7750 aren't revealed and U.S. law requires that visa determinations be kept secret. The visa bans apply for life.

The leaked cable began:

Embassy is seeking a security advisory opinion under Section 212(f) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, Proclamation 7750, suspending the entry into the United States of Aaron Gitonga Ringera and members of his family. Ringera was born in Meru, Kenya on June 20, 1950. Post strongly believes Mr. Ringera has engaged in and benefited from public corruption in his capacity as Director/Chief Executive of the Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission (KACC) for the last five years by interference with judicial and other public processes, and that this corruption has had a serious adverse impact on U.S. national interest in the stability of democratic institutions in Kenya, U.S. foreign assistance goals and the international economic activities of U.S. businesses.

In November 2009, we talked about Ambassador Ranneberger. He had made 'a very strange announcement' on his Twitter page, we said, confirming that the U.S. government had denied a visa to Kenya's attorney general Amos Wako. It was the first time an American official had revealed a visa determination under Proclamation 7750.

Justice Ringera, the subject of the leaked cable, became head of Kenya's anti-corruption agency in 1999. He resigned in 2009 when the country's parliament said his re-appointment by the president was illegal. He had been a judge on Kenya's high court and court of appeal.

The leaked cable said:

Justice Aaron Ringera, is at the heart of Kenya's debilitating corruption problem. While it was anticipated that he would be part of the solution when he took office, he has, instead, become an important element in a system of protection for political elites. Post strongly believes that Mr. Ringera has engaged in and benefited from public corruption in his capacity as KACC Director for the past five years by interference in public and judicial processes. The record demonstrates that:

-- the KACC Director is part of the group protecting itself from prosecution for the Anglo-Leasing scandal;

-- he participated in at least one meeting in which the attempted assassination of John Githongo was planned this year;

-- he was aware of threats to Kenyan anti-corruption official John Githongo and shared them with Githongo as an apparent intermediary;

-- Ringera has not successfully investigated for prosecution a single case involving a senior [Government of Kenya] official in five years in a country that is consistently rated as among the most corrupt in the world;

-- Ringera has not acted on recommendations from Parliament or followed through on his own recommendations for prosecution to the President of Kenya;

-- Ringera has stopped pursuing Anglo-Leasing cases, one of Kenya's largest scandals for which no senior level investigations/prosecutions have been concluded;

-- The backdoor manner in which Ringera was reappointed makes clear the premium value placed on him heading the KACC among the political elite.

Ringera was not 'informed of the fact that he may be ineligible for a U.S. visa under section 212(f) of the INA and Proclamation 7750,' the cable said. 

It said his last U.S. visa expired on July 15, 2007. "Mr. Ringera has travelled frequently to the United States," the cable continued. "He is expected shortly to apply for a U.S. visa."

The cable concluded: 'Because of the serious effect of Mr. Aaron Ringera's corruption, Post recommends that Mr. Ringera be excluded for travel to the U.S. under section 212(f) of the INA and that no exception be granted.'

The cable 'SUBJECT: VISAS DONKEY: CORRUPTION 212(F) VISA DENIAL REF: A. 08 STATE 81854' can be viewed here.

Are We Safer Yet?

In light of the Christmas Day attack on Northwest Flight 253 from Amsterdam to Detroit, let's go off topic with an item from the December edition of Foreign Policy magazine. The story is hard to believe but apparently true:

Since 2007, the U.S. State Department has been issuing high-tech "e-passports," which contain computer chips carrying biometric data to prevent forgery. Unfortunately, according to a March report from the Government Accountability Office (GAO), getting one of these supersecure passports under false pretenses isn't particularly difficult for anyone with even basic forgery skills.

A [Government Accountability Office] investigator managed to obtain four genuine U.S. passports using fake names and fraudulent documents. In one case, he used the Social Security number of a man who had died in 1965. In another, he used the Social Security number of a fictitious 5-year-old child created for a previous investigation, along with an ID showing that he was 53 years old. The investigator then used one of the fake passports to buy a plane ticket, obtain a boarding pass, and make it through a security checkpoint at a major U.S. airport. (When presented with the results of the GAO investigation, the State Department agreed that there was a "major vulnerability" in the passport issuance process and agreed to study the matter.)

From "The Top 10 Stories You Missed in 2009," Foreign Policy (December 2009) here.

*   *   *

Proceed to passport control. Here's an excerpt from our March 9, 2009 post:

The government [of Kenya] in 2002 had said it wanted to update the way it printed and tracked its passports. Everything would be new and high-tech. A French company was found for the job, at a price of €6 million. But the contract went instead to an unknown U.K. company called Anglo Leasing Finance, at a price of €30 million. There was no public tender and the story only leaked to the press because of a junior civil servant. [Government graft-buster John] Githongo grabbed the investigation. Two years later, he'd uncovered about twenty government contracts awarded to phantom overseas companies at inflated prices, signaling the presence of high-level corruption. And most of the tainted contracts related to Kenya's security apparatus -- passport controls, forensic labs, security vehicles and satellite services, among others.

U.K. Bans Kenyans For Corruption

Britain has banned 20 Kenyans from entering the country. According to reports last week from the BBC and others, the names of those banned haven't been made public but they may include senior civil servants, politicians and businessmen. Britain's High Commissioner (ambassador) to Kenya, Rob Macaire, said the ban was necessary because Kenya has never convicted a senior official of corruption.

In November, the U.S. ambassador to Kenya, Michael Ranneberger, confirmed on his Twitter page that the U.S. government had denied a visa to Kenya's attorney general Amos Wako. It was the first time an American official had revealed a visa determination under Presidential Proclamation 7750, the executive order giving the State Department the power to exclude foreign kleptocrats, their families and friends. See our post here.

In July 2007, the U.K.'s Serious Fraud Office opened a criminal investigation into contracts between the Kenyan government and a U.K. business known as Anglo Leasing Finance. The contracts for passport controls and border security systems were awarded to phantom overseas companies at inflated prices that topped $100 million. Kenya refused to cooperate and in February this year the SFO ended its investigation, saying without support from the Kenyan government the case couldn't be prosecuted.

Attorney General Wako has denied being involved in corruption and blamed the lack of cooperation with the SFO on Kenya's judicial system. 

Kenya's former top anti-corruption officer, John Githongo, began investigating Anglo Leasing Finance after his appointment in 2002. He delivered his report to President Mwai Kibaki in November 2005. (A copy, later leaked to the public, can be downloaded here.) He received death threats and fled to England. From there, Githongo publicly blew the whistle on many of Kenya's top politicians. President Kibaki was forced to fire three ministers -- though he reappointed two of them a year and half later.

Writing Modern History

An extended interview in this month's Guernica with Michela Wrong is great reading. She's the British journalist who's current book is It’s Our Turn to Eat: The Story of a Kenyan Whistle-Blower. In the book and the interview, she uses the story of John Githongo to talk about the root causes of corruption in Africa, digging deep into tribalism, colonialism and western aid. In other words, she's a serious (but never boring) journalist -- we'd call her a "writer and thinker" -- who doesn't fall for slogans and bumper stickers when it comes to the causes of graft and its cures.

We won't spoil the interview. But here's the set up:

On February 6, 2005, John Githongo appeared at Michela Wrong’s London doorstep, on the run and fearing for his life. Githongo, Kenya’s anti-corruption czar, had done his job too well. Over the past two years, Githongo had uncovered a string of shady procurement deals that led directly to the same ministers who had hired him, including President Mwai Kibaki. In the largest of these, a mysterious British firm called Anglo Leasing was awarded government contracts at hugely inflated prices.

When Githongo investigated the company, he was told to back off, eventually discovering that Anglo Leasing did not exist—“Anglo Leasing,” one minister told a stunned Githongo, “is us.” Then the death threats began. Wrong, a long-time Africa correspondent for various British publications and a friend of Githongo’s, had extended the invitation for a London stay at their last dinner together, where Githongo seemed nervous and distracted. That was three months earlier. Now here he was, suitcase in hand, in need of a safe house. . .

Read our prior posts about John Githongo here.

* * *
From Frederic Bourke's Trial. On Friday the prosecution rested its case. The defense called Robert Evans, Bourke's friend since their seventh-grade in Michigan. His account, Bloomberg's David Glovin reported, "contradicted that of Hans Bodmer, [Viktor] Kozeny’s former lawyer, who earlier testified that he told Bourke details of the bribery scheme during a walk around an Azerbaijan hotel at 8 a.m. on Feb. 6, 1998."

Evans said he and Bourke didn't arrive in Baku that day until 9:30 a.m. and didn't talk with Bodmer until hours later. Evans also said Bodmer told them the Azeri president supported Kozeny’s venture and “was in on the deal.” But he said nothing about illegal payments.

Glovin recaps the case this way: "Bourke, who was once married to a member of the family that owned Ford Motor Co., is accused of investing $8 million with Kozeny knowing he was paying bribes. Backed by $350 million, Kozeny wanted to buy Azerbaijan’s state oil company, known as Socar, for one-tenth of what he valued it and to re-sell it at a profit. . . . Bourke denies knowing of the bribes and says Kozeny stole more than $180 million from him and other investors. Azerbaijan, a nation in the Caspian Sea region, never sold Socar, wiping out the investment. Kozeny, who has also been charged in the case, is a fugitive living in the Bahamas."

Why, by the way, do we mention David Glovin so often? Because he's the only journalist publishing regular accounts of Bourke's trial. He's also a great reporter who covers the federal courthouse in Manhattan for Bloomberg. When the Madoff story broke on his turf, his dispatches -- packed with facts, color and analysis that reached beyond daily journalism -- led the international coverage. So we're lucky he's sitting in on the Bourke proceedings, which he thinks might conclude this week.

Read David Glovin's reports on the trial here.

Read all our posts about U.S. v. Kozeny and the prosecution of Frederic Bourke here.
.

Proclamation 7750 Unwrapped

Last week, while we were looking into ways the U.S. fights foreign kleptocrats, we heard about Presidential Proclamation 7750. It was issued in 2004 and, by 2006, a high State Department official was calling it a "key tool" in America's anti-corruption arsenal. Yet except for a couple of mentions we found in the African press, Proclamation 7750 was -- and is -- practically invisible.

To find out why, and to learn more about how this anti-corruption tool works, we spoke this week with a couple of U.S. State Department officials. They can't be identified and wouldn't go on the record. But here's the background they provided.

The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act doesn't reach the kleptocrats -- it applies only to bribe-payers and not bribe-takers. And the truth, as the kleptocrats know, is that they're beyond the reach of practically all the laws of other countries. There just aren't that many big sticks to use against corrupt foreign officials.

That's why Presidential Proclamation 7750 is so important. It was issued a year after the G-8's 2003 commitment to deny safe havens to kleptocrats. It helped do that by suspending entry into the United States of past and present corrupt foreign officials and those who bribe them. It also barred their spouses, children, and dependents who benefited from the corruption.

The State Department can't publicly release the names of those denied entry under Proclamation 7750 -- U.S. law generally prohibits disclosure of visa-related information. And while the deterrent effect can't be measured, the idea is that whatever makes life more difficult or expensive for kleptocrats is a good thing. The Kenyan reformer John Githongo, for example, has advised the U.S. that denying the children of corrupt African leaders access to U.S. and U.K. universities is a big deal. The State Department says it welcomes that kind of input, and that's why Proclamation 7750 is only used against children who are college age and above.

The American press hasn't talked about Proclamation 7750, and that's too bad. It's probably because the names of the banned kleptocrats have to be kept secret, draining the entertainment value and pizzazz out of the story. But because quite a few corrupt foreign leaders believe they've been banned from the United States because of Proclamation 7750, and have complained back home about their treatment at the hands of U.S. authorities, the law is better known in developing countries, especially among those who might be targeted.

State Department officials regularly meet with anti-corruption NGOs. Any allegations leveled by NGOs are carefully evaluated along with other available evidence to determine that the individuals fall within the categories defined in the Proclamation. A decision to designate is vetted by several bureaus at the State Department and is approved by a high-level Department official. And despite the public's lack of awareness, the government thinks the program is working well. As when an NGO reported that corrupt officials in a developing country were engaged in systematic and illegal asset stripping of the country's natural resources. A State Department official said the NGO report led to further U.S. investigations and ultimately to some visa determinations under Proclamation 7750.

Sometimes leads come to the State Department from whistleblowers. They're typically anti-corruption investigators or officials in developing countries who've been effective in their roles -- and are therefore fired from their jobs, threatened, or blocked by corrupt judges or opponents. They might show up at a U.S. embassy, ready to talk. The information they bring is checked -- sources are vetted for reliability and evidence is weighed for credibility. Other sources are sought. "We don't want the United States to be used as a tool by political factions in other countries," an official said. "So we're very tough when we look at the evidence. Otherwise the program will lose credibility." For example, corroboration sometimes comes from bank documents showing secret transfers of illicit cash.

The visa bans are essentially lifetime actions, so the stakes are high. The program has plenty of support within the government -- in recent appropriations bills, for example, Congress directed the State Department to use Proclamation 7750 to ban from the U.S. foreign officials "involved in corruption relating to the extraction of natural resources in their countries." The State Department can even use Proclamation 7750 to ban foreign leaders who travel on diplomatic passports, except in limited cases where the U.S. is bound by treaty-based obligations.

This post is Part II of our series, Cornering The Kleptocrats. In Part III, we'll talk about a proposed way to pursue, prosecute and punish corrupt public officials.
.